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Note
Curbing Injurious PAC Support Through
2 U.S.C. § 441d
Senatorial candidate John Goodman and his advisors huddle
around a television to watch the broadcast of a controversial commer-
cial endorsing his candidacy. "Did you know George Enright was dis-
ciplined for cheating at State University?" inquires the narrator as the
screen depicts a student staring brazenly onto his classmate's examina-
tion paper. The scene shifts to show an adult stumbling into his car
while the narrator continues, "Did you know George Enright was
charged with drunk driving? Our state cannot afford to have a senator
of Enright's character; vote for John Goodman, a man of proven char-
acter." A picture of Goodman appears on the screen, and the commer-
cial fades out.
Goodman and his campaign advisors are furious. The repeated
telecasts of the commercial are causing a backlash of public opinion
against Goodman. Support for his election is declining steadily, but
Goodman is unable to halt the broadcasts of the commercial. The neg-
ative commercial campaign against Enright is financed and produced
by a fully independent political action committee (PAC)' over which
Goodman has no control. Nonetheless, the public reacts against Good-
man who they assume controls or encourages the dissemination of
commercials that advocate his election and his opponent's defeat.
The scenario depicts how a candidate's campaign can be harmed
when an independent political organization attempts to help the candi-
date. Although the Goodman-Enright campaign is fictional, such inju-
rious PAC support occurred during the 1982 Maryland senatorial
campaign. Candidate Lawrence Hogan's campaign was seriously un-
dermined by a negative PAC advertising campaign directed against his
1. The term political action committee (PAC) commonly refers to political organiza-
tions created for the purpose of making campaign contributions or expenditures. A PAC is
legally defined as any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives
aggregate contributions exceeding $1000 per year or makes expenditures in excess of $ 1000
per year, or any separate segregated fund covered by 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b); or certain local
committees of a political party. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (1982).
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opponent, Senator Paul Sarbanes. 2 This Note will refer to such elec-
tion assistance that backfires because the voters misperceive the source
of the communication as "injurious PAC support."
The problem of injurious PAC support has not been addressed by
legal commentators.3 Politicians who must conduct election cam-
paigns, however, have considered the potential dangers of injurious
PAC support. In 1976 Congress enacted 2 U.S.C. § 441d,4 apparently
in an attempt to reduce the danger of injurious PAC support. This
statute, governing the distribution of political statements, imposed
identification requirements on political statements concerning candi-
dates. These requirements enable the recipients of political communi-
cations to distinguish communications authorized and paid for by a
candidate from those statements independently produced and distrib-
uted by political action committees.
This Note first examines the reasons for the rapid development of
PACs within the last fifteen years. The Note then considers the legisla-
tive solution to the problem of injurious PAC support embodied in 2
U.S.C. § 441d, and focuses on its requirement that political communi-
cations include attribution and authorization statements. By compel-
ling the disclosure of specific information related to political
statements, however, section 441d implicates the first amendment. This
Note analyzes the first amendment issues and concludes that the law is
constitutional. Finally, the Note considers the desirability and effec-
tiveness of section 441d as a means of eliminating injurious PAC
support.
2. See infra notes 31-33 & accompanying text.
3. Commentators have focused on other aspects of PACs. See, e.g., Adamany, PACs
and the Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 AIuz. L. REv. 569 (1980) (focusing on the effects
of PACs on campaign financing); Elliott, PoliticalAction Committees-Precincts of the '80s,
22 ARiz. L. REV. 539 (1980) (refuting the public's popular misconceptions about PACs);
Mayton, Politics, Money, Coercion, and the Problem with Corporate PA Cs, 29 EMORY L.J.
375 (1980) (exploring the growth of corporate PACs); Nicholson, The Constitutionality of the
Federal Restrictions on Corporate and Union Contributions and Expenditures, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 945 (1980) (examining the constitutionality of the restrictions on corporate and union
participation in the political process codified in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971);
Sorauf, Political Parties and PoliticalAction Committees: Two Lfe Cycles, 22 ARIz. L. REV.
445 (1980) (discussing the impact of PACs on political parties); Vandegrift, The Corporate
PoliticalAction Committee, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 422 (1980) (suggesting major revisions in the
statutory scheme regulating PACs so that regulation of corporate and individual contribu-
tions would be harmonious); Wertheimer, The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics, 22
ARiz. L. REV. 603 (1980) (concentrating on PACs' influence on the political process).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 323,
90 Stat. 475, 493 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1976) (amended 1980)).
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Background
The rapid growth of PACs is linked to the development of cam-
paign funding reforms in the late 1970s. During the early 1970s, polit-
ical action committees were relatively rare.5 Post-Watergate
revelations of campaign abuses led Congress to enact a variety of elec-
tion reforms in 1974 as amendments to the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA).6 An examination of these reforms and their subsequent
judicial interpretation elucidates the rapid growth of PACs.
The FECA amendments limited contributions t67 and expendi-
tures on behalf of8 a particular candidate, placing a $1,000 ceiling on
individuals and a $5,000 ceiling on political committees.9 The Act also
required candidates to disclose the sources of their contributions.' 0 Fi-
nally, the Act created the Federal Election Commission to monitor fed-
eral elections."
These provisions do not directly promote PACs. When the
Supreme Court modified FECA in Buckley v. Valeo,'2 however, it cre-
ated a mechanism by which campaign contributors could circumvent
FECA's requirements through the use of PACs. In Buckley, the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of campaign spending
and contribution limits.13 Reasoning that political spending, unlike
political contributions, constituted speech deserving full constitutional
protection,' 4 the Court held that imposing a limit on the amount an
individual could spend on behalf of a candidate was an impermissible
infringement on first amendment rights. 15
The Court sustained the limit on contributions on the ground that
the state has a compelling interest in curtailing the actual or apparent
5. In 1972 there were only 113 PACs, Isaacson, Running Wifh the PACs, TIME, Oct.
25, 1982, at 22, most of which were organized by labor unions. Id For a more recent
estimate of the number of PACs in existence, see infra note 22 & accompanying text.
6. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(l)(A)
(1982)).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1)(C)
(1982)).
10. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-437 (Supp. IV 1974) (amended 1980).
11. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1976) (amended 1980).
12. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
13. Id. at 29, 35.
14. Id at 19-21.
15. Id at 54-57.
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corruption that results from large financial contributions. 16 The Court,
however, did not find a compelling governmental interest in limiting an
individual's political expenditures because it considered expenditures
less likely to lead to corruption.1 7 The Court concluded that because
such expenditures must be made independently of the candidate, they
were less likely to be "given as a quid pro quo for improper commit-
ments from the candidate."' 8 Moreover, independent expenditures
may "provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed
may prove counterproductive."' 19 Thus, expenditures on behalf of the
candidate were constitutionally protected from limitations.20
Consequently, under the rule of Buckley an individual may spend
unlimited amounts advocating the election of a candidate, but may
contribute only $1,000 directly to the candidate or to the candidate's
campaign committee. Individuals can circumvent the $1,000 limit,
however, by contributing unlimited funds to a PAC, which then can
contribute up to $5,000 to a candidate or independently spend an un-
limited amount to advocate the candidate's election or defeat.2'
The growth of PACs since Buckley has been phenomenal. By
1982, the number of PACs had soared to 3,149.22 PAC contributions
and expenditures for 1982 were estimated at $240 million.23 Although
the vast majority of PACs are associated with corporations, labor un-
ions, or professional and trade associations, 24 a number of PACs advo-
cate certain ideals rather than the interests of any particular
organization, and support candidates professing similar beliefs.25
16. Id at 26-27.
17. Id at 45-47.
18. Id at 47.
19. Id
20. Id at 51.
21. The expenditure limit struck down by the Buckley court on first amendment
grounds applied to individuals, groups, political committees, corporations, and associations.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23. Therefore, a PAC, like an individual, may make unlimited expendi-
tures. A multicandidate political committee, however, is limited to making direct contribu-
tions to a candidate not in excess of $5,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(2)(A) (1982).
22. Isaacson, supra note 5, at 20. Commentators advance varying estimates of the
number of PACs existing in 1982. See, e.g., Sanoff, PA1C Spells More Than a Game in Poli-
tics, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Oct. 25, 1982, at 37 (more than 3,200); San Francisco
Chron., Feb. 23, 1983, at F5, col. 1 (3,371 PACs).
23. Isaacson, supra note 5, at 20.
24. The 1980 FEC report categorizes PACs as labor, corporate, trade/mem-
bership/health, and non-connected. See 1980 F.E.C. ANN. REP. 29 (1980). In 1980, non-
connected PACs numbered fewer than 500 out of 2,500 total PACs. Id
25. Ideological PACs are characterized by the lack of an affiliation with an institution,
such as a labor union or a corporation, and by adherence to a viewpoint within the liberal-
conservative spectrum. Sorauf, supra note 3, at 453 n.42. The non-connected category of
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These non-connected PACs may pose a greater threat to the integrity of
the electoral process than the other categories of PACs because they
frequently use campaign ads that attack the opponent.2 6 In 1980 nega-
tive campaign expenditures constituted fourteen percent of the total
money spent in all federal elections and seventy-eight percent of the
independent money spent in Senate races.27 Some commentators be-
lieve that because they are organized independently of other social in-
stitutions, the non-connected PACs are less accountable for the tone
and content of their campaigns than are candidates or political par-
ties.28 Terry Dolan, chairman of NCPAC, commented that "[a] group
like ours could lie through its teeth and the candidate it helps stays
clean." 29
Campaign tactics used by non-connected PACs, however, can ac-
tually injure the candidate endorsed by the PAC.30 For example, in the
1982 Maryland senatorial campaign, Republican Lawrence Hogan
challenged incumbent Maryland Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes.
In an attempt to defeat Sarbanes and to elect Hogan, NCPAC waged a
$650,000 negative campaign against Sarbanes.3I Sarbanes called atten-
tion to NCPAC's mud-slinging campaign tactics in order to turn public
PACs includes ideological PACs. I"d at 453 n.43. For example, the National Conservative
Political Action Committee (NCPAC) is a large, independent, ideological PAC that is unaf-
filiated with a particular party or candidate and is dedicated to electing conservative candi-
dates and defeating liberals. NCPAC achieved national recognition by targeting a number
of liberal Senators for defeat in the 1980 elections and then contributing substantially to the
defeat of four of them. Goldman & Fineman, The War ofthe Wof-PAC's, NEWSWEEK, June
1, 1981, at 38; Isaacson, supra note 5, at 21; Sanoff, supra note 22, at 37.
26. For example, NCPAC discussed plans to launch a two million dollar negative cam-
paign against Democratic Candidate Walter Mondale in 1984. C.B.S. Evening News, Feb.
15, 1984; San Francisco Chron., Feb 16, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
27. San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 29, 1981, at A9, col. I; FEDERAL ELECTION COM-
MISSION, 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 11-12.
28. Goldman & Fineman, supra note 25, at 41; Isaacson, supra note 5, at 22.
29. Goldman & Fineman, supra note 25, at 41; Isaacson, supra note 5, at 22.
30. "[R]elentless pressure by the PACs can cause a backlash against their own candi-
dates." Stone, Have Calumny, Will Travel, NATION, Oct. 10, 1981, at 346. Senator Charles
Grassley stated shortly after the 1980 elections that NCPAC's support "had a somewhat
negative impact" on his campaign because of the "flamboyant" and "negative" campaign it
had conducted against his opponent. Id at 345. In preparation for the 1982 elections, the
Massachusetts' Republican leadership urged NCPAC to forego a negative campaign against
Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy for fear that the attack would only add to his support.
See Goldman & Fineman, supra note 25, at 38. PACs can also injure the candidate's cam-
paign by focusing on polarizing issues that the candidate might prefer to de-emphasize in
the interest of coalition building. Stone, supra, at 346. Consequently, PAC expenditures
may well disrupt the efforts of the candidate and his staff to direct the campaign in a manner
calculated to elect the candidate. The Supreme Court recognized this possibility in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
31. Attack Pac, TIME, Oct. 25, 1982, at 26.
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opinion against Hogan. Sarbanes' tactic proved successful and frus-
trated Hogan's campaign. In an attempt to distance himself from
NCPAC, Hogan proclaimed during a television debate, "I hereby de-
nounce NCPAC.' ' 32 Time Magazine concluded that NCPAC's guns
had backfired.33
The Injury From Independent PAC Campaigns
PACs can advance the cause of a candidate's election by offering
contributions and making unlimited expenditures on the candidate's
behalf. PAC support can backfire, however, and actually harm a can-
didate's campaign. The harm usually takes the form of voter disaffec-
tion due to public misperception concerning the candidate's
responsibility for controversial campaign communications. This harm
is especially egregious if the candidate has neither solicited nor author-
ized the PAC's efforts. In this section the Note considers PAC indepen-
dence and voter misperception as two components of the injurious
PAC support.
PAC Independence
Buckley held that an expenditure is protected from monetary limi-
tations only if it is made independently of the candidate and her cam-
paign.34 Pre-arrangement or coordination between the PAC and the
candidate or her agents would convert an expenditure into a contribu-
tion.35 Consequently, PAC commercials or literature will qualify as in-
dependent expenditures only if they are designed, produced, and
disseminated without the candidate's consent or involvement.36 Thus,
the candidate can have no voice in the expenditures initiated by PACs.
A candidate may be partly responsible for the injury resulting
from PAC support if she has endorsed the PAC's actions.37 A candi-
date who lacks control over the PAC, however, cannot be deemed mor-
32. Id.
33. Id
34. 424 U.S. at 5.
35. Id at 46-47. In a footnote in Buckley, the Court specifically stated that expendi-
tures made with the consent of the candidate or her agents are contributions. Id. at 46 n.53.
36. The statute requires that independent expenditures be made without the candi-
date's, or his agents', request, suggestion, cooperation, or consultation. 2 U.S.C. § 431(17)
(1982). It logically follows that if the candidate becomes involved in the expenditure to the
point that it constitutes a contribution, then the candidate is responsible for the conse-
quences of the political communications just as the candidate would be responsible for ac-
cepting a contribution.
37. See infra note 41 & accompanying text.
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ally or legally responsible for any harm resulting to her campaign.
Because it fosters the growth of independent PACs, the Buckley deci-
sion facilitates campaign expenditures over which the candidate has lit-
tle control, but it does not indicate how the candidate should be
protected from any adverse effects of the independent expenditures.
Moreover, because independent PAC expenditures are free from
monetary limitations, 38 such expenditures may constitute a significant
source of communications endorsing a candidate. The potential for in-
dependent communications increases the likelihood that the public will
erroneously attribute PAC communications to the candidate.
Voter Misperception
Despite the PAC's independence from the candidate, the public is
likely to believe that the candidate does play a role in the PAC commu-
nications endorsing her campaign. If the public mistakenly believes
that the candidate and PAC are linked, any public reaction against the
PAC will in turn be directed against the candidate. Thus, regardless of
the candidate's actual involvement with a PAC's expenditures, public
belief in her responsibility for the PAC campaign may well harm the
candidate. For example, in the Sarbanes-Hogan campaign, Hogan was
injured by Sarbanes' attempts to link NCPAC with Hogan.39
A false perception of a connection between the candidate and the
supportive PAC can arise from a variety of sources. First and fore-
most, the perception arises from the commonality of interest between
the candidate and the organization. Both want the candidate elected
and her opponent defeated. Because the PAC is endorsing the candi-
date, the voters assume that the PAC and the candidate are working
together. Moreover, the average voter may be unaware of the Buckley
requirement for the independence of PAC expenditures.
The inference that a candidate has approved a commercial sup-
porting her campaign may be strengthened by the use of the candi-
date's name within the name of the PAC organization. For example,
one of the largest PACs in 1980 was the "1980 Republican Presidential
Campaign Committee for Ronald Reagan." 40 The name implies a di-
rect connection with the candidate. Moreover, the PAC's name may be
so similar to that of the candidate's official campaign committee that
38. See supra note 21 & accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 31-33 & accompanying text.
40. The 1980 Republican Presidential Campaign Committee for Reagan spent approxi-
mately $314,690 in 1980, making it the ninth biggest spending PAC for that year. Stone,
supra note 30, at 345.
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the public, although aware that there are two separate organizations,
becomes confused about which organization is authorized by the candi-
date. In the previous example, the name of the PAC is similar to that
of Reagan's designated campaign organization, the "Reagan for Presi-
dent Committee."
Finally, a general skepticism toward politics might lead people to
disbelieve the apparent independence of the decision-making of a sup-
portive PAC from the candidate. Such skepticism is justified if the can-
didate does act in concert with the PAC. If there is actual cooperation
or collusion between PAC and candidate, the voters will not withdraw
support or votes based upon a misperception of responsibility, but
upon a correct assessment of the relationship between the supportive
PAC and the candidate. Injurious PAC support results only when the
voters falsely blame the candidate for the independent actions of a sup-
portive PAC or falsely impute to the candidate the political statements
of a PAC.41 The Buckley court, by removing monetary limitations on
independent expenditures, facilitated PAC activities and greatly in-
creased the risk of injurious PAC support.
A Legislative Solution: Section 441d
The tremendous implications of the Buckley decision brought
about an immediate response from Congress. In 1976 it enacted a vari-
ety of election reforms deemed "necessary and desirable in light of the
Supreme Court decision in the case of Buckley v. Valeo."42 One of
these new laws, 2 U.S.C. § 441d,43 directly reduced the danger of inju-
rious PAC support.
Section 441d, which governs the distribution of political state-
ments,44 effectuates a combination of identification requirements to
eliminate the false impression of PAC-candidate interaction that is the
primary cause of injurious PAC support. The law requires political
41. A supportive PAC ad or commercial could disrupt the candidate's campaign strat-
egy by emphasizing former statements or viewpoints which are unpopular or which the can-
didate no longer holds. If the PAC statements about the candidate are accurate, there is no
unjust injury; the public becomes more informed about the candidate's views, and the candi-
date is held responsible for her prior statements. Injurious PAC support, however, is the
unjust injury caused by public misperception of the candidate's responsibility for the state-
ments or actions of the independent PAC.
42. 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 930.
43. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1976) (amended 1980).
44. The statute applies to statements made through "any broadcasting station, newspa-
per, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, direct mailing, or any other type of general or
public advertising." 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1982).
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communications to contain two types of clauses that enable the public
to distinguish a statement made by the candidate from one made by an
independent organization. The statute requires an attribution clause
identifying the party paying for the communication and an authoriza-
tion clause indicating whether the candidate has authorized the com-
munication. 45 Although section 441d does minimize the risk of
injurious PAC support, recent amendments to the statute have substan-
tially weakened its effectiveness.
Section 441d, as adopted in 1976, divided communications into
two categories: authorized and unauthorized. Communications au-
thorized by a candidate or her agents were required "clearly and con-
spicuously, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the [Federal
Election] Commission, [to] state that the communication has been au-
thorized. '46 Communications not authorized by a candidate or her
agents were required "clearly and conspicuously, in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Commission, [to] state that the commuini-
cation has not been authorized by a candidate," 47 and to state who
made or financed the communication.48 If the party financing the un-
authorized communication was a PAC, the statute mandated disclosure
of certain affiliated organizations. 49
These requirements compelled both candidates and PACs to ac-
cept public responsibility for their communications. PACs not only
had to identify themselves and their affiliates as the parties financing
the communication, but they also had to state whether the candidate
authorized their actions. Congress' decision to require these identifica-
tion clauses can be interpreted as an attempt to eliminate potential
public misconception as to various parties' responsibility for political
statements.
In 1980, however, Congress sharply curtailed the force of section
441d.50 Although Congress expanded the two categories of communi-
45. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1982). This Note defines the attribution clause as
the requirement that the communication state who paid for it. The authorization clause is
the section of the statute requiring the communication to state whether it is authorized or
unauthorized.
46. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(1) (1976) (amended 1980).
47. Id § 44ld(2).
48. Id
49. Id. In the case of statements made by political committees, the section required
such statements to include the name of any affiliated or connected organization required to
be disclosed under 2 U.S.C. § 433(b)(2) (1982).
50. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, title I,
§§ 105(5), 111, 93 Stat. 1354, 1365 (1980).
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cations to three,5 1 it removed the requirement that statements comply
with Commission regulations52 and, more importantly, it deleted the
word "conspicuous" from the statute.5 3 If the communications are au-
thorized and paid for by the candidate, the candidate need not state
that the communication was authorized.54 The attribution clause, how-
ever, was retained for the other categories of expenditures.5 5 Congress
also eliminated the requirement that unauthorized communications
identify affiliated organizations. 56
These changes weakened the force of the statute. Under the
amended statute, the identification clauses need only be stated
"clearly" as opposed to "clearly and conspicuously in accordance with
Commission regulations. '57 The 1976 requirement that PACs clearly
identify affiliated groups ensured that the public could distinguish a
PAC from a candidate and could discern the character and identity of
the PAC. Under the amended statute, a PAC need only state its
name.5 8 Without additional identifying information, the name of a
PAC could easily be confused with the name of an authorized political
organization.5 9
The 1976 requirement that the candidate state whether she had
authorized the communication60 compelled the candidate to accept
personal responsibility for her political statements. The 1980 amend-
ments removed this authorization requirement. This authorization dis-
closure clarified for the public whether the candidate or an
independent organization was the source of a communication. Now
the candidate need only state the financial sponsor of the communica-
tion.6' Because the authorized communication is normally paid for by
the candidate's designated committee rather than by the candidate her-
self, only the committee name will appear.62 As noted previously, the
names of the campaign committee and that of the PAC may be similar,
51. These categories are: (1) communications paid for and authorized by the candi-
date, (2) communications paid for by others but authorized by the candidate, and (3) com-
munications not authorized by the candidate. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1982).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. I.d § 441d(a)(1).
55. Id § 441d.
56. Id § 441d(a)(3).
57. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441d(l), (2) (1976) with 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1982).
58. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441d(2) (1976) with 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1982).
59. See supra note 40 & accompanying text.
60. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(l) (1976) (amended 1980).
61. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(1) (1982).
62. Id
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causing confusion about who is the source of the campaign communi-
cation. A statement that the candidate has authorized the communica-
tion, however, lets the public know whether the candidate should be
held responsible for controversial campaign communications.
Notwithstanding the 1980 amendments, section 441d still reduces
the danger of injurious PAC support by requiring public disclosure of
the actual relationship between PACs and candidates. Section 441d
thus helps eliminate the inference that candidates and supportive PACs
are linked.
The Constitutionality of Section 441d
Section 441d mitigates the danger of injurious PAC support by
compelling individuals and organizations to state the source of political
statements. By requiring disclosure of this information, however, the
law raises constitutional questions concerning freedom of speech, pri-
vacy, and association.
The constitutionality of the unamended section 441d was raised in
Federal Election Commission v. Central Long Island Tax Reform. 63 The
defendant was charged with violating section 441d by distributing a
pamphlet describing the voting record of a politician without identify-
ing the pamphlet's author or distributor." The trial court submitted
the matter to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for an en bane ruling
on the constitutionality of the statutes at issue.65 The court, however,
resolved the issue on non-constitutional grounds.66 The majority left
open the question of constitutionality, 67 although the two concurring
justices expressed doubts about the statute's validity.68
This Note will analyze the constitutionality of section 441d by
comparing the statute with similar statutes whose constitutionality has
been upheld by the courts. Because the original and amended versions
contain similar clauses, their constitutionality will be jointly assessed.
The attribution and authorization clauses, however, will be considered
separately because they present different analytical problems.
63. 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980).
64. Id. at 48-51.
65. Id. at 47.
66. Id at 52. Additionally, the court indicated that, even if § 441d was unconstitu-
tional, the literature at issue did not fall within the scope of the statute because it did not
expressly advocate the election or defeat of the candidate. Id at 52-53.
67. Id. at 51.
68. Id at 54 (Kaufman, C.J., concurring).
May 1984]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The Attribution Clause: Facial Validity
The attribution clause in the amended section 441d requires that a
communication advocating the election or defeat of a candidate iden-
tify the party paying for the communication.69 The constitutionality of
this clause can be assessed by examining the holding in Talley v. Cali-
fornia7O and succeeding cases.7 '
In Talley the United States Supreme Court struck down an attri-
bution requirement because the Court found that it violated the first
amendment. At issue was a city ordinance requiring all handbills to
bear the names and addresses of the individuals who prepared or dis-
tributed them.72 The Court noted that "[t]here can be no doubt that
such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to
distribute information and thereby freedom of expression. ' 73 The
Court, relying on two prior cases holding that under certain circum-
stances states may not compel public identification of individuals or
groups engaged in the dissemination of ideas,74 found the ordinance to
be unconstitutional on its face.75
The rationale for the Talley holding, as well as the prior decisions,
was that public identification could result in fear of reprisal from dis-
gruntled individuals. If this fear deters individuals from engaging in
peaceful discussions of important public matters, their first amendment
rights are infringed.76 The Talley majority recognized the importance
of protecting the right to criticize oppressive practices and laws while
preserving the speaker's anonymity.77
The Court, however, left open the question whether a more limited
ordinance would be constitutional. 78 For this reason, Talley should
69. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a)(1)-(3) (1982).
70. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
71. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 453 U.S. 765 (1978); United States v. Insco, 365 F.
Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973) rev'd on other grounds, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D. N.D. 1961).
72. Talley, 362 U.S. at 60-61.
73. Id. at 64.
74. Id. (citing Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (disclosure of NAACP
membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (court order to produce
NAACP records and membership lists)).
75. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
76. Id; Bates, 361 U.S. at 523-24; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462-63.
77. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
78. Id. The concurring and dissenting justices stated that despite such an infringement,
the law could be sustained if a compelling governmental interest is demonstrated. Id at 66
(Harlan, J., concurring); id at 67 (Clark, J., dissenting). The dissenters argued that the ordi-
nance sought to prevent fraud, deceit, false advertising, libel, and obscenity, and that these
objectives were compelling. Id at 69-70 (Clark, J. dissenting). The majority found the ordi-
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be narrowly read as invalidating only overly broad attribution re-
quirements.
The Talley decision reflects the view that precision of regulation is
the touchstone of first amendment jurisprudence.79 Attribution clauses
that are narrower in scope than the one at issue in Talley have with-
stood constitutional attack. United States v. Harriss80 involved a fed-
eral statute that required individuals engaged in lobbying to disclose
their identities and information concerning the source and distribution
of money.8' The Supreme Court upheld the statute despite a challenge
on first amendment grounds. The Court found a compelling govern-
mental interest in ensuring that elected representatives may properly
evaluate the source of political pressure.8 2
The strong governmental interest in protecting the integrity of the
democratic system recognized in Harriss should also justify election at-
tribution disclosure requirements such as the one contained in section
441d. 3 In fact, two lower court opinions84 upheld the validity of the
political attribution requirement contained in the predecessor to section
441d, 18 U.S.C. § 612.85 Section 612, applicable to federal candidates,
was far more limited in scope than the ordinance in Talley, which en-
nance unconstitutionally overbroad because it affected "any handbill in any place under any
circumstance," id at 63, and because no showing had been made that the ordinance was
limited or directed to fraudulent, false, or deceitful communications. Id at 64. The Court
noted the absence of any legislative history indicating that the law's purpose was to identify
the makers of false advertising or libelous statements. Id.
79. See Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 658
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephrain, 452 U.S. 61, 70 (1981);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972).
80. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
81. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, ch. 753, § 308, 60 Stat. 841 (1946) (codified at
2 U.S.C. § 267 (1982)). This statute requires disclosure of the names and addresses of lobby-
ists and their employers, as well as the destination, source, and amounts of monies
expended.
82. Harrss, 347 U.S. at 625. Otherwise, the Court concluded, "the voice of the people
may all too easily be drowned out by the voice of special interest groups. . . masquerading
as proponents of the public weal." Id.
83. As Justice Clark commented in his dissent in Talley, "no civil right has greater
claim to constitutional protection or calls for more rigorous safeguarding than voting
rights." 362 U.S. at 70 (Clark, J., dissenting).
84. United States v. Insco, 365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973), rev'don other grounds,
496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D. N.D. 1961).
85. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 724, amended by Act of Aug. 25, 1950, ch.
784, § 2, 64 Stat. 475) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 612) (repealed 1976). This law made it a
crime for any person willfully to mail or to transport in interstate commerce written materi-
als concerning any publicly declared candidate for specified federal offices if the materials
did not contain the names of the individuals or organizations responsible for distributing the
communication.
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compassed all handbills regardless of subject matter. An analysis of
these holdings indicates that a court determining the constitutionality
of section 441d would be inclined to follow these cases rather than
Talley.
In United States v. Scott 86 the defendant was charged with violat-
ing section 612 by distributing election pamphlets that did not bear the
names of persons responsible for the distribution and publication.87
Scott challenged the statute on the ground that it violated the first
amendment under the holding in Talley."" The district court rejected
this constitutional challenge because the statute only compelled disclo-
sure of the identity of pamphlet writers and distributors in certain spec-
ified instances.89 The court found that the underlying purpose of the
attribution clause was to inform the electorate and to assist them in
determining why a candidate was being supported or opposed by an
individual or group.90 The law enabled voters to cast their ballots in-
telligently, 9' and it eliminated the danger of the circulation of surrepti-
tious literature concerning candidates92 by requiring the disclosure of
the authors' or distributors' names. The court found no evidence that
section 612 subjected individuals to fear of reprisal or harassment. 93
The mere allegation of a possibility of reprisal was deemed insufficient
to render the law unconstitutional. 94 Moreover, the court concluded
that the great value of the law far outweighed the supposed infringe-
ment of the defendant's rights.95
The constitutionality of section 612 was again challenged in
United States v. Insco.96 Insco, a congressional candidate running
against Gunter, had manufactured and distributed bumper-stickers
reading "McGover-Gunter." The stickers did not state that Insco had
paid for them. They were apparently designed to convince the public
that they had been published by Gunter.97 Insco argued that Talley
86. 195 F. Supp. 440 (D. N.D. 1961).
87. Id at 441.
88. Id. at 442.
89. Id at 443.
90. Id.
91. id
92. Id. at 444.
93. Id at 443.
94. Id
95. Id. at 444.
96. 365 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1973), rev'don other grounds, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.
1974).
97. Id at 1311. The court suggested that Insco's actions constituted a "fraud on the
public," but noted that this "particular factor is not a required element of the offense prohib-
ited by § 612." Id
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was applicable and required a finding that section 612 was void on its
face.98 The court observed that, unlike the broad ordinance in Talley,
section 612 was far more limited, applying only to statements concern-
ing candidates for specified offices. 99 The Court concluded that section
612 was limited in its coverage to requiring fairness in federal elections
and "does not preclude the anonymous criticism of oppressive practices
and laws referred to by the majority in Talley."'1 °
The Scott and Insco courts distinguished section 612 from the or-
dinance in Talley on the ground that section 612 was narrower in scope.
Because the Talley ordinance applied to all handbills, it affected the
right to criticize the government and speak out on public issues, as well
as the ability to comment on a particular candidate. I° 1 The impact of
section 612 was far more limited because it was confined to statements
concerning candidates for specific offices. For this reason, both courts
found that it did not actually deter free speech.'0 2
Like section 612, section 441d contains a narrow attribution re-
quirement. Section 612 applied to statements concerning any person
who had "publicly declared his intention to seek the office of President,
Vice President, Senator, Representative in or Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to Congress in a primary, general or special election or
convention of a political party." 10 3 Section 441d similarly applies to
"clearly identified" candidates. 1°4 Although section 612's language is
more detailed, 105 the statute itself is no more limited in effect than sec-
tion 441d. As a federal election law, section 441d can apply in no more
situations than did section 612. Moreover, section 441d is arguably
more restrictive than its predecessor, section 612. Section 441d applies
only to communications "expressly advocating the election or defeat"
of a candidate.106 Section 612, on the other hand, applied to communi-
cations "concerning" a candidate, whether or not they advocated the
candidate's election. 0 7 Because section 441d is at least as limited as
98. Id. at 1312.
99. Id.
100. Id
101. The Talley court was most offended by this aspect of the ordinance. 362 U.S. at 64-
65.
102. See supra notes 89, 99, 100 & accompanying text. Neither court reached the ques-
tion whether the underlying governmental interests would be compelling if balanced against
an actual infringement of speech. See also infra note 108 & accompanying text.
103. Act of August 25, 1950, ch. 784, § 2, 64 Stat. 475, 475-76 (repealed 1976).
104. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1982).
105. Section 612 specified all the federal offices for which a candidate could run.
106. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1982).
107. Act of August 25, 1950, ch. 784, § 2, 64 Stat. 475, 475-76 (repealed 1976).
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section 612, its constitutionality should be upheld under the reasoning
of Scott and Insco.10 8
Further indication of the constitutionality of 441d may be found in
dictum contained in the Supreme Court case of First National Bank v.
Bellottl 10 9 In striking down a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corpo-
rations from making contributions or expenditures in certain referen-
dum elections, 110 the Court suggested that a political attribution clause
would be upheld. In response to the contention that voters would be
unable to identify and to assess corporate expenditures, the Court
stated that "[i]dentification of the source of advertising may be required
as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the
arguments to which they are being subjected."11' The Court cited
Buckley and Harriss in support of this assertion. 1 2 Viewed alongside
the holdings in Scott and Insco, this language in Bellotti is a further
indication that section 441d's attribution clause would be found
constitutional.
The Attribution Clause: Specific Applications
Two Supreme Court decisions' 13 require an analysis of whether a
disclosure law is constitutional not only on its face, but also as applied
to all political organizations, PACs, and individuals. In both Buckley
and Brown v. Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Committee,114 the
Supreme Court held that facially constitutional contribution disclosure
laws can be unconstitutional when applied to particular minor political
108. The opinions in Scott and Insco failed to reach the question whether the govern-
mental interests would be sufficiently compelling if the attribution requirements infringed
on first amendment rights. As discussed earlier, the court in Scott did state, however, that
the governmental interest "far outweigh[ed]" any supposed infringement. 195 F. Supp. at
444. More importantly, neither the Scott nor the Insco court expressed the slightest doubt
that the federal election attribution requirements were valid. "Surreptitious publications by
unknown authors are an evil which Congress has seen fit to proscribe .... It is a valid
exercise of legislative power in the national interest." Scott, 195 F. Supp. at 444. The Insco
court simply noted that "[the] statute is therefore limited in its coverage to requiring fairness
in federal elections and does not preclude anonymous criticism of oppressive practices and
laws referred to by the majority in Talley," 365 F. Supp. at 1312, thereby suggesting that
compelling interests might justify an infringement of first amendment rights.
109. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
110. Id. at 776.
I11. Id. at 792 n.32.
112. Id.
113. Brown v. Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
114. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
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parties." 5 Therefore, even if section 441d is found facially constitu-
tional, the constitutionality of specific applications of section 441d must
be determined separately.
In Buckley and Brown, the disclosure law required political parties
to divulge the identities of financial contributors. The Court found that
"in certain circumstances the balance of interests requires exempting
minor political parties from compelled disclosures." 116 It reasoned that
the governmental interest in compelling disclosure was outweighed in
the case of minor parties because the fear of reprisal might severely
infringe on an individual's rights of privacy, association, and belief." 7
The fear of reprisal may be of greater concern to minor parties than to
larger, well-established political parties because minor parties may
have different and perhaps unpopular ideologies." 8 For this reason the
Court was concerned that public disclosures might cause individuals to
refrain from joining or making contributions to minor parties.
The attribution requirement in section 441d would not subject
members of, or contributors to, minor parties to a comparable danger
of reprisal. In contrast to the law at issue in Buckley and Brown, which
required a political party to identify its contributors, section 441d only
requires the identification of the person financing the communication.
Under section 441d a "person" is defined as including organizations
and committees.1' 9 Thus, section 441d requires the organization to
state its name, but it does not require the organization to identify its
individual members or contributors. 120 Consequently, it is unlikely
that the attribution requirement of section 441d would subject individ-
ual members of a minor PAC to the danger of reprisal and thereby
infringe on their freedom of association. The attribution requirement
of section 441d should be found constitutional as applied to all political
organizations.
The Authorization Clause
Although the attribution requirement of section 441d should sur-
115. Id. at 92-93 (Ohio statute held unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers
Party); Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
116. Brown, 459 U.S. at 92 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70).
117. Brown, 459 U.S. at 93; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64.
118. Brown, 459 U.S. at 93; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71. Minor parties "are less likely to
have a sound financial base and are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions." Brown,
459 U.S. at 93 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 71). If the falloffs were severe, the minor parties
could not survive. Id
119. 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (1982).
120. See 2 U.S.C. § 441d(a) (1982).
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vive constitutional attack, the authorization clause presents a more dif-
ficult question because no federal court has ruled on the
constitutionality of such a requirement. The authorization clause of
section 441d, as amended in 1980, requires that all communications
advocating the election or defeat of a candidate that are not paid for by
the candidate state whether they have been authorized by the candi-
date.' 2 ' Because the statute compels individuals and groups to make
statements, the constitutionality of this requirement is at issue. 22
Although the Second Circuit declined to determine the constitu-
tional validity of section 441 d in Federal Election Commission v. Central
Long Island Tax Reform,123 two concurring justices expressed doubt
concerning the constitutionality of such compelled speech.' 24 An ex-
amination of their argument reveals its weakness. The two concurring
justices argued that the first amendment presupposes that free speech
without government regulation is the best method of informing the
electorate. 125 For this reason, they argued, the courts have consistently
struck down all "government regulation of speech designed to make
information available to the public."' 26 They implied that promoting
the availability of information could never justify a disclosure of au-
thorization requirement.' 27
In support of this argument, the justices cited Talley z8 and Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.12 9 These cases, however, are inappo-
site. As previously discussed, the Talley ordinance was found unconsti-
tutional not because it required disclosure, but because it was overly
broad.1 30 The court never considered whether the public's interest in
information could justify a disclosure requirement where the statute
was more narrowly tailored.
Nor does Miami Herald stand for the proposition that regulating
speech to make information available to the public is invalid in all cir-
121. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441d(a)(2), (3) (1982).
122. The first amendment protects "the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all." Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
123. 616 F.2d 45 (2d. Cir. 1980).
124. CenfralLonglslana 616 F.2d 45,54 (2d Cir. 1980) (Kaufman, C.J., concurring). In
addition to § 441d, 2 U.S.C. § 434(e) was also at issue. This statute required political com-
mittees other than principal committees to file a statement of organization with the FEC.
616 F.2d at 47 n.1.
125. Id. at 54.
126. Id.
127. Id
128. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
129. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
130. See supra notes 73-78 & accompanying text.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
INJURIOUS PAC SUPPORT
cumstances. Miami Herald involved a state statute that required news-
papers to publish the replies of candidates whom they had criticized in
order to give the public another side of the controversy. The Supreme
Court reluctantly held the right of reply statute to be an unconstitu-
tional infringement on freedom of the press.' 3' The Court based its
decision on the ground that the regulation compelled the newspaper to
publish material which in its own good judgment it had decided not to
publish,132 thus abridging the press' editorial discretion and first
amendment rights.
The Miami Herald holding, however, does not encompass all stat-
utes regulating or compelling speech without limitation.133 Previously,
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,134 the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a right of reply statute that applied to television and radio
broadcasts.' 35 The Court concluded in Red Lion that the broadcaster's
interest in exercising editorial discretion was outweighed by the pub-
lic's interest in the free flow of information.136 Red Lion demonstrates
that regulations on speech aimed at making information available to
the public can be and have been held constitutional, thus refuting the
argument of the concurring justices in Central Long Island Tax Reform.
In summary, the arguments advanced against the constitutionality
of section 44 ld's authorization clause are defective. Attribution clauses
pose a constitutional question because the danger of reprisal from indi-
viduals who dislike the statements may deter individuals or groups
from exercising their constitutional rights of expression and associa-
tion. 137 The authorization clause of section 441d does not produce such
dangers. The authorization clause requires only that a communication
state whether it is authorized by any candidate, and does not require
the identification of the maker of the statement. Therefore, a disgrun-
tled individual would not know whom to harass or to threaten. Identi-
fication, not authorization, is the element that creates the danger of
reprisal. For this reason, the rationale underlying Talley is inapplicable
to authorization clauses.
A first amendment violation might occur if an individual refrains
131. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
132. Id.
133. Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: 4 Double Standard For Electronic and Print Media,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 659 (1975). "The Supreme Court has adopted a double standard in appli-
cation of the fairness doctrine to broadcasting and print media." Id
134. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
135. Id at 400-01.
136. Id at 390.
137. See supra notes 76, 86-95 & accompanying text.
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from making the statement because she fears the disclosure that a com-
munication is unauthorized will diminish the degree of credibility at-
tributed to the communication. The courts are unlikely to view this as
a serious infringement of speech, however, in light of numerous hold-
ings that the source of a statement is an important consideration in the
voters' assessment of a statement's value. 138
Section 441d's authorization clause does not infringe upon an indi-
vidual's freedom of speech or association. The statute compels only a
factual statement that will not deter individuals from airing their polit-
ical views. The authorization clause, like the attribution clause, does
not violate the first amendment.
Recommendations
The existence of an informed electorate is essential to the success
of democracy. 139 To promote a marketplace of ideas so that reasoned
decisions could be made, the framers of the Constitution sought
through the first amendment to ensure the free circulation of ideas by
protecting the freedoms of the press and of speech. 40
Congress has enacted a variety of laws compelling individuals and
groups to disclose certain information that enables voters and repre-
sentatives to assess conflicting viewpoints and arguments and to make
informed decisions. In sharp contrast, injurious PAC support thrives
on misperception, misinformation, and an uninformed electorate. The
harm arises when voters mistakenly believe that a candidate is wholly
or partially responsible for the acts of supportive political organizations
and individuals. If the misperception is eliminated, so too is the danger
of injurious PAC support.
Section 441d helps to inform the electorate and eliminate this mis-
perception. Through its authorization and attribution disclosure re-
quirements, section 441d exposes the actual relationship between the
candidate and supportive individuals and organizations. In so doing,
section 441d not only helps to protect candidates from the harm of in-
138. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976); United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440, 443 (D. N.D. 1961);
see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) (upholding statute requiring dis-
closure of information from lobbyists because such information was deemed necessary for
elected representatives to evaluate properly the political pressures they are subjected to).
139. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
381 F.2d 908, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1967), qfj'a 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
140. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927).
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jurious PAC support, but also allows voters to assess accurately the re-
lationships between candidates and their supporters.
Given the important state interests that section 441d protects, the
infrequency of proven cases of decisively injurious PAC support is no
justification for laxity in eliminating potentially misleading political
statements. The only logical reason for opposing stringent attribution
and authorization requirements is that such requirements deter individ-
uals from making political statements, because they fear that the identi-
fication of a communication's source might diminish the
communication's effectiveness. This concern is entitled to little weight
because it is based on the premise that truthful disclosure should be
limited in order to preserve an individual's ability to confuse, mislead,
or deceive voters.
For the above reasons, section 441d is a welcome device for pro-
moting an informed electorate. Congress should strengthen the ex-
isting requirements of section 441d to further this important aim. An
excellent starting point would be the reenactment of the "clear and
conspicuous" requirement contained in the 1976 version of the stat-
ute.' 4 ' The attribution and authorization statements presently appear
at the end of the communication, often in small print. A requirement
that the information be displayed prominently in print media, or orally
in the case of television broadcast communications, would greatly in-
crease public awareness of the relationship between a candidate and
political communications.
Congress should further require the inclusion of a brief explana-
tory statement such as: "A Political Action Committee's legal right to
expend amounts in excess of $5,000 per candidate is dependent upon
the committee's total independence from the control or influence of any
candidate." This statement would help to clarify the little understood
and highly complex relationship between contributions, expenditures,
PACs, and candidates brought about by the Buckley decision. Enact-
ment of these proposals might diminish the confusion, misrepresenta-
tion, and skepticism incident to political campaigns.
Conclusion
Injurious PAC support is a serious problem involving one of de-
mocracy's most basic concerns-the maintenance of an informed elec-
torate. Injurious PAC support only arises when voters mistakenly
blame the candidate for the actions of a supportive, but independent,
141. 2 U.S.C. § 441d(2) (1976) (amended 1980).
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PAC. By requiring attribution and authorization disclosures, section
441d helps protect the candidate by diminishing misperceptions about
the candidate's responsibility for a particular communication. More
extensive disclosure requirements should minimize the danger of inju-
rious PAC support. In a broader sense, section 441d strengthens the
American democratic process by compelling the disclosure of informa-
tion voters need to assess accurately the relationship between a candi-
date and a PAC, thus contributing to a more perfectly informed
electorate.
Mitchell L. Gayno*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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